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BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL CONTENT
Ranjan Dutta, Sirkka Jarvenpaa, Kerem Tomak, Department of Management Science and
Information Systems. University of Texas at Austin. Austin, TX 78712

Abstract
Increased use of the Internet for the distribution of digital products allows firms to embrace new
business models. These models provide higher levels of product customization. In search of a better
match between products and consumers’ willingness to pay, many online and mobile content providers
have recently started to add new charging methods to their existing pricing strategies. Currently, a
gap exists between a firm’s decision to implement a pricing mechanism and the firm’s consideration of
consumers’ behavior towards acceptance of that pricing mechanism. What can firms do to better align
their revenue models with consumers’ behavioral norms? If an answer exists, and we will offer one, it
will directly relate to the design, implementation and pricing of information goods. From the point of
view of an online content provider this paper examines implications of one of the many types of
consumers’ economic anomalies: mental accounting (MA). More specifically, we look at how mental
accounting (MA) of payment for and consumption of digital content at the consumer level impacts firm
level choices of pricing strategies.
Our results show that MA of payments and consumptions change firms’ pricing strategy for digital
content. For the firm which has high digital content customization level, pay-per-use and pay-later
strategies are always inferior to subscription. In contrast, under neoclassical assumptions, firms are
equally well-off from employing any price scheme. Our results also show that in a duopolistic market
for information goods, firms must be knowledgeable of MA’s influence on the market. MA’s influence
is magnified if the level of customization is a further differentiating factor. We present general
conditions under which profits increase with the intensity of MA. Also, our results offer insights into
the choice of pricing schemes by content distribution networks as well as mobile service providers and
may provide an explanation as to how economic and behavioral aspects of digital consumption may
interact.
Keywords: Online Payment Systems, Mental Accounting, Game Theory, Digital Content.
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INTRODUCTION

Motivated by the current usage and pricing mechanisms in the wired and wireless digital content
distribution networks, this paper studies and analyzes pricing strategies that can be used by current and
future digital content providers. For the last few years, researchers have looked into the provision of
customized content as one of the burgeoning business models whose development has been bolstered
by the growth of Internet (Carr, 2000). In the industry, content providers are envisioning to use
Internet as a high-performance, reliable vehicle for delivering bandwidth intensive, rich multimedia
content. Over the last year and a half, we have seen this viewpoint gaining in strength as mobile
Internet commerce offered us glimpses of some even richer possibilities in that direction. A prime
example of this is that of successful mobile service operator and content provider, NTT DoCoMo of
Japan, which provides an array of popular customized content services like stock quotes, email
services or weather information to its customers over the mobile internet (Alves et al., 2001).
Mobile internet also gives the content providers a better opportunity to reach the consumer at the
moment when his/her demand for a particular customized content is at its highest. Note that when the
consumer utility is at its peak, so also is her readiness to pay for that utility. Content provision through
both wired and mobile Internet combined with other media may make it be possible to reap higher
consumer surplus by providing customized content at the most appropriate instant.
Even though provision of customized online content may already be a technical feasibility, content
provision will never be viable unless it is backed by an economically sustainable business model. The
endeavor of this paper is to look into the pricing issues that are connected to the delivery of contentbased services.What kind of pricing strategy should a content provider follow to maximize its own
profits? Given their ability to provide customized content how should competing content providers
strategically choose their pricing strategies? We have to stress the essence of this setup. Although we
compute optimal prices, the final decision that the firms make is the choice of a price scheme, not the
setting of an equilibrium price.
Over the last few years we have seen various online payment mechanisms being conceptualized secured credit card like transactions, stored value systems, micropayments, mobile payment systems
etc.(Deutsche Bundesbank Study, 1999; Mishra and Gustafson, 2001). Each of these payment
mechanisms is different from the other in the way it is devised and each can be expected to have its
own unique impact on a consumer. Research on behavioral decision theory has indicated that there can
be significant impact on consumers, which arises out of differences in timing between payments and
consumptions (Prelec and Loewenstein, 98). For example, in cases of online credit card payments or
direct billing to access providers, actual consumption of digital content (like accessing a customized
stock summary) precedes payment as aggregate payments are generally made at the end of a billing
cycle (Blok, 2001). On the other hand, there are payment mechanisms like digital money where the
consumers pay in advance against anticipated future consumptions. Similarly there are payment
mechanisms, like direct debiting, where payment and consumption are simultaneous i.e. a consumer
pays as she consumes, just like using cash or a debit card in a normal transaction.
This paper is an attempt to derive some intuitive understanding of how these pricing strategies may be
employed by the digital content providers. We present a game theoretic model where two content
providers compete for consumer market share. To keep the model generic in nature, we have not
differentiated between the media (landed Internet, mobile Internet or anything else) through which the
content providers may reach their customers. Firms are differentiated simply by their ability to provide
customized content and their pricing strategies.
Our model uses concepts from behavioral decision theory to derive results that can be significant for
revenue structures employed by digital content providers. We have refrained from establishing any
link between these strategies and actual payment mechanisms like credit cards, e-cash etc. Each
strategy is simply dependent on when the consumer is making a payment vis-à-vis her consumption.
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PRIOR RESEARCH ON DIGITAL CONTENT PRICING

In recent times, both academic and practitioner research has looked into the issue of content delivery
and pricing of content (Lippman, 2000). Two generic revenue models are discussed by a number of
academic scholars -- "advertising" model (indirect), where content is free with revenue coming from
advertisements and "pay-for-content" model (direct), where consumers pay for use of content. Winder
(2001) professed that unlike other media, Internet content delivery mechanisms should rely more on
"pay-for-content" models over "advertising" models since Internet allows more interactivity between
the consumer and the content provider. In a more restricted setting, Yuan et al. (1998) explored the
question whether traditional practices of bundling advertisements with content will prevail or become
less common on the Internet. In a similar direction of research, Dewan et al. (2002) theorized the
significance of balance between advertising and content on the profitability of websites. As the utility
to the consumer from content services seems to be on the rise (with more interactivity or with more
customization), the general direction of research appears to indicate a use of more "pay-for-content"
models.
Quite a few researchers have looked into pricing of Internet content provision by differentiating
between access services and content delivery -- access being provided by the network provider while
content is being produced and delivered through the network by the content provider. Content is
essentially looked upon as a pre-existing information product with high development costs and low
variable costs. As few firms compete in the such markets, the content providers are seen as near
monopolies (Jones and Mendelsohn, 1997). In a distribution channel based study, Dewan et al.(2000)
show that content providers prefer Internet channels to direct channels only if the access market is
sufficiently competitive.
Mackie-Mason et al. (1996) analyzes how differences in network systems affect offering of content to
consumers. Here content pricing is considered as a sub-strategy of the network provider. The authors
analyzed pricing strategies for three kinds of networks -- "application aware, content aware",
"application aware, content unaware" and "application unaware" networks. An aware network controls
content selection, thus order choices for consumers are based on profits generated by each content
offering. Content is treated more like mass produced low value items. On the other hand, in a blind
network like the Internet, consumers control content selection. Thus content offerings are ordered by
consumers' maximal willingness-to-pay which make them characteristically similar to high value
niche items like consumer durables.
Jaganathan (2002) studies two primary transaction models for selling content -- "quoted price" model
and "sealed-bid auction" model, where customer quoted a price. However, unlike other research, he
acknowledged presence of both dynamic consumer behavior (i.e. consumer behaving differently at
different points of time) and diversity among consumers.
We can see that prior research on online content pricing strategies essentially conceived "content" as
just another consumer durable. The primary question was, how could content providers generate
revenue from such products? In our paper, we take a different approach. Firstly, demand for any
customized content is a variable and given a context, the content provider also has a varying capability
to satisfy that demand. Secondly, behavioral decision theories have indicated that individuals do not
always act rationally (in an economic sense) and they differ from one another in their behavior
towards a given stimuli (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). More specifically, individuals differ in the
degrees to which payments attenuate pleasure of consumption (attenuation) or consumption buffers
pain of payment (buffering) (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998).
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BENCHMARK CASE

As the benchmark case, we start with a duopoly market for content providers They play a discrete
price setting game in which each firm has three pricing strategy choices. For simplicity, we take the

length of the consumption period as two. At each time period, a consumer has desired utility
u ∼ U (0,1) . Strategies are differentiated on the basis of when the consumers are required to make
their payments p against these consumptions. They are diagrammatically shown in Figure 1. A firm
can choose to induce the consumer to pay at the beginning of the consumption period. In another
strategy, consumer pays for what she consumes and in the third, the consumer pays at the end of
second period. Note that the game is not a two stage game but rather a one stage game with strategies
by the firms chosen at the beginning of the first period but the consumption takes place over two time
periods.
Strategy F:
u

u
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B

p
Strategy M1
u

u
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A
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p
Strategy M2:
u

u
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Figure 1.

Strategy timeline

Let the strategy space be given by Ω = {F , M 1 , M 2 }. Content providers have different abilities to
satisfy a consumer's desired utility u . The ability to provide the desired consumer utility is captured
by a factor θ ∼ U (0,1). It can also be interpreted as the quality of the content in terms of how well it
matches the consumer's expectations. If a content provider chooses the strategy F , net utility to the
consumer is (1 + δ )θu − p where p is the payment made at the beginning of stage1 (point A in
Figure 1) and

is the discount factor. Using the same notation, net consumer utilities under the

strategy choices M 1 and M 2 are derived as (1 + δ )(θu − p) and θu + δ (θu − p) respectively.
We assume that a consumer either chooses one of the two content providers to satisfy her desired
utility or simply decides not to use any of the two services (when her net utility from payment and
consumption becomes less than 0 ). Let p 1 and p 2 be the prices charged by Firm 1 and 2
respectively. Also let θ1 and θ 2 signify the degrees to which the Firms 1 & 2 satisfy a consumer's
desired utility u. We calculate the payoffs for each firm as follows. (We demonstrate the calculation
method for the strategy ( F , F ) . Rest of the payoffs are calculated similarly). A consumer who is
indifferent between the two content providers equates the net consumer surplus from each

(1 + δ )θ1u − p1 = (1 + δ )θ 2 u − p2
Similarly, the consumer who is indifferent between buying from a firm, say Firm 2, and not buying at
all solves

(1 + δ )θ 2u − p2 = 0
Solving for u, we have the utility level of the marginal consumer

u∗ =

p1 − p2
(1 + δ )(θ1 − θ 2 )

Let those consumers with utility level above u ∗ purchase content from the provider 1 and the rest
from provider 2. Then demand for content providers' services can be written as

D1 = 1 −
D2 =

p1 − p2
(1 + δ )(θ1 − θ 2 )

p1 − p2
p2
−
(1 + δ )(θ1 − θ 2 ) (1 + δ )θ 2

and the profits are
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Equilibrium prices are found by maximizing each profit level with respect to the corresponding prices:
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Finally, the payoffs are
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We find that the payoffs are the same for all the other strategy options that the firms have. Note that
although equilibrium demands and prices for services from the two content providers are different for
each strategy combination, optimal profits (payoffs) derived for each cell are found to be exactly the
same as above. It does not make any difference whether the consumer pays earlier, or later or as she
consumes in terms of the resulting payoffs the firms receive. Hence we have proved the following
theorem:

Theorem Under perfect expectations assumption, in equilibrium, digital content providers remain
indifferent between any of the three price schemes. Furthermore, there is no strong Nash equilibrium
of the game in which the firms choose price schemes.
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MENTAL ACCOUNTING CASE

It is plausible that consumers differ from one another in their sensitivity to timing of payments and
consumption (Gourville 1998). Mental accounting allows us to incorporate these differences in our
model. In the first game we differentiate between the acts of consumption and payment. Consumption
is looked upon as a utility and payment is looked upon as a disutility. But mere separation of
consumption and payment does not produce any differentiation between the three revenue collection
schemes since we use net benefit to analytically derive the demands and calculate the profits. Hence,
in the MA case, in addition to separation of consumption from payment, a notion of residual effects is
incorporated into the model.
The concept of residual effects adapted from vast literature on MA is as follows: a consumer's utility
of consumption is attenuated by a residual disutility of payment that she associates with that utility of
consumption (Prelec 1998). Similarly, consumer's disutility of payment is buffered by a residual
(positive) utility of consumption that she associates with her payment. We coin these residual effects
"payment blow effect" and "consumption bliss effect".
When payment and consumption are simultaneous, the link between the payment and the specific
consumption act becomes salient to the mind of the consumer (Thaler 1999). But when payment is
separated from consumption, each event triggers its own cognitive processes and during a given event
there are only residual effects from associated payments or consumption. Payment blow is the residual
effect that reduces the pleasure of consumption by reminding the consumer about payments that she
associates with that consumption. Consumption bliss is the residual effect that reduces the pain from
making a payment by reminding the consumer about the pleasure she associates with that payment.
Magnitude of temporal separation between payment and consumption is also believed to play a
crucial role (Gourville 1998, Gourville 2002). In our model we disregard the magnitude of temporal
separation and concern ourselves with only coupling /decoupling of payments from consumption.
The concept of coupling coefficients is as follows: Each utility of consumption is attenuated by a
disutility of making a payment. Similarly, each disutility of payment is buffered by a (positive) utility
of consumption. We use α ∈ (0,1) and β ∈ (0,1) to calculate net utility of consumers where α
represents the degree to which payments attenuate pleasure of consumption and β represents the
degree to which consumption buffers the pain of payment. Each consumer is assumed to have her own
levels of α and β . Thus differences in consumers are captured by these two coefficients in our
model.
An example will make the use of the above concept clearer. Let's consider a consumer who uses
content provided by one of the firms employing pricing strategy F . Consumption utility for this

u p A where p A is the imputed cost of consumption. Imputed cost of
strategy will be
consumption at any point can be imagined to be a net attenuation in experienced utility of the
consumer arising due to making of a payment at the same point. Similarly, disutility of making
payments is buffered by the imputed benefit derived from each payment. Thus payment disutility for
strategy F will be p

u A where u A is the imputed benefit of payment.

When the content provider chooses the pricing strategy F , a consumer has consumption experiences
at points A and B and payment experience at point A (Figure 1). Then, imputed cost of consumption at
point A, is

☺

p
2

and imputed cost of consumption at point B, is 0 . Thus, the consumer's utility

from consumption experience when the content provider chooses strategy
follows:

u1

☺

F can be written as

p
2 . Similarly, imputed benefit from payment at point A is equal to 2 u

. Thus, the consumer's utility from payment experience is 2 u

u1

strategy F can be written as

2 u

p. Thus, net consumer utility for

☺p

1

2

Like in the benchmark game, payoffs are optimal profits. We assume in this case that

1

1 and

denoting 2
. Thus,
can now be interpreted as the degree to which Firm 2 approaches Firm 1
in its ability to satisfy a consumer's demand. Net consumer utilities with these changes are as follows:
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And finally, we compute the payoffs in this case as in Table 1.
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− (82(+23+αβ)()(−−41++θθ))2 ,− 2( 2( 2++3αβ )()(−−41++θθ ))θ2
Payoffs for each firm.

We solve the normal form game derived from the results in the table above by comparing the payoffs
to each other and solve for the highest payoff strategy. We show in Dutta and Tomak (2003) that

M1

M
strategy is dominated by F and 2 strategies and the following theorem follows:

Theorem If an existing consumer group exhibits consumption characteristics in accordance to
mental accounting, digital content providers choose either fixed up-front or delayed payment scheme
in equilibrium. Hence the only Nash implementable strategies are ( F , M 2 ), ( M 2 , M 2 ) ,
( M 2 , F ).
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CONCLUSION

Information systems literature on digital content provision uses traditional microeconomic theories to
analyze pricing problems and naturally, overlooks consumer anomalies in decision making. In
contrast, mental accounting (MA) research studies consumers' cognitive processes but do not
investigate the implications of MA on firm level pricing strategies. This paper, motivated by an IT
driven phenomenon, looks at firm level pricing strategies in a market under the influence of MA. We
do not profess whether consumers maintain or do not maintain mental accounts. Within MA literature,
Prelec and Lowenstein (1998) show that consumers do maintain mental accounts and prefer prepayments over post-payments. Ariely (2002) investigates the value of micropayment or pay-per-use
strategies to consumers. But a key question remains, and it is the one that we answered: how should
firms select pricing schemes given these consumer preferences? Our results show that firms need to be
knowledgeable about the existence of MA. When consumers exhibit MA characteristics, not only does
a firm have greater incentives to choose different but relevant pricing strategies but awareness of MA
characteristics also generates higher profits. In fact, complementary to what Prelec and Loewenstein
(1998) or Ariely (2002) posit, we show that in a duopolistic content provisioning environment it still
makes sense for a firm to adopt a post-payment strategy over pre-payment or micropayment strategies.
By taking the firms' perspective, we build the bridge between their findings at the consumer level and
the firm level strategies from an analytical perspective. We foresee several directions for future
research.
Various technology enabled payment schemes have already been conceptualized to provide payment
options to content providers and other firms that conduct business over the Internet. Many of these
schemes are influenced by the timing of payments and consumptions. MA theorizes that decoupling
payments from consumption do matter to consumers. Do IT rich environments reinforce or diminish
these residual effects that consumers experience? As firms control the payment methods and the
information revealed to the consumer, how does the technology change the mental accounts of the
consumers and lead to outcomes which are undesirable for the consumers? The role of technology in
payment mechanisms has only rarely been investigated in the MA literature (Dutta et al. 2003). As
business models incorporate more Internet based payment mechanisms and as the consumers face an
ever-increasing amount of choices for payments, it is of paramount importance to analyze the
interaction between consumers' purchase decisions and information goods.
In this paper, we investigated only a static game where both firms assume that consumers maintain
mental accounts. From a firm strategy perspective, there can be several ways to empirically and
analytically extend our findings to include more complicated scenarios. One possibility is to look at an
asymmetric information scenario where only one of the two firms has knowledge about the existence
or non-existence of MA. This is a situation when one firm has more knowledge about consumers but
the other firm blindly assumes all consumers to be rational decision-makers. Another extension may
be that the market need not only constitute MA or neoclassical consumers, but may contain a mixture
of both. In such a situation, it is interesting to find out how firms strategize. It may be interesting to
see whether the same equilibrium strategies, in symmetric and asymmetric information scenarios - as
well as in cases where the market has a mix of consumers - hold in an experimental setup. Cooperation
between firms as a result of firm level adaptive learning can also constitute a direction for future
research. Finally, consumer learning may have an effect on the firms' strategies. This can arise in a
situation where consumers which exhibit MA characteristics learn to behave (or are taught to behave)
like a rational decision maker over time. Several of these ideas are subjects of our current studies.
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